12e The Safety and Quality of Health Care

David W. Bates

Safety and quality are two of the central dimensions of health care. In recent years it has become easier to measure safety and quality, and it is increasingly clear that performance in both dimensions could be much better. The public is—with good justification—demanding measurement and accountability, and payment for services will increasingly be based on performance in these areas. Thus, physicians must learn about these two domains, how they can be improved, and the relative strengths and limitations of the current ability to measure them.

Safety and quality are closely related but do not completely overlap. The Institute of Medicine has suggested in a seminal series of reports that safety is the first part of quality and that the health care system must first and foremost guarantee that it will deliver safe care, although quality is also pivotal. In the end, it is likely that more net clinical benefit will be derived from improving quality than from improving safety, though both are important and safety is in many ways more tangible to the public. The first section of this chapter will address issues relating to the safety of care and the second will cover quality of care.

SAFETY IN HEALTH CARE

Safety Theory and Systems Theory   *Safety theory* clearly points out that individuals make errors all the time. Think of driving home from the hospital: you intend to stop and pick up a quart of milk on the way home but find yourself entering your driveway without realizing how you got there. Everybody uses low-level, semiautomatic behavior for many activities in daily life; this kind of error is called a *slip*. Slips occur often during care delivery—e.g., when people intend to write an order but forget because they have to complete another action first. *Mistakes*, by contrast, are errors of a higher level; they occur in new or nonstereotypic situations in which conscious decisions are being made. An example would be dosing of a medication with which a physician is not familiar. The strategies used to prevent slips and mistakes are often different.

Systems theory suggests that most accidents occur as the result of a series of small failures that happen to line up in an individual instance so that an accident can occur **(Fig. 12e-1)**. It also suggests that most individuals in an industry such as health care are trying to do the right thing (e.g., deliver safe care) and that most accidents thus can be seen as resulting from defects in systems. Systems should be designed both to make errors less likely and to identify those that do inevitably occur.

FIGURE 12e-1   "Swiss cheese" diagram. Reason argues that most accidents occur when a series of "latent failures" are present in a system and happen to line up in a given instance, resulting in an accident. Examples of latent failures in the case of a fall might be that the unit is unusually busy and the floor happens to be wet. *(Adapted from J Reason: BMJ 320:768, 2000; with permission.)*

Factors that Increase the Likelihood of Errors   Many factors ubiquitous in health care systems can increase the likelihood of errors, including fatigue, stress, interruptions, complexity, and transitions. The effects of fatigue in other industries are clear, but its effects in health care have been more controversial until recently. For example, the accident rate among truck drivers increases dramatically if they work over a certain number of hours in a week, especially with prolonged shifts. A recent study of house officers in the intensive care unit demonstrated that they were about one-third more likely to make errors when they were on a 24-h shift than when they were on a schedule that allowed them to sleep 8 h the previous night. The American College of Graduate Medical Education has moved to address this issue by putting in place the 80-h workweek. Although this stipulation is a step forward, it does not address the most important cause of fatigue-related errors: extended-duty shifts. High levels of stress and heavy workloads also can increase error rates. Thus, in extremely high-pressure situations, such as cardiac arrests, errors are more likely to occur. Strategies such as using protocols in these settings can be helpful, as can simple recognition that the situation is stressful.

Interruptions also increase the likelihood of error and occur frequently in health care delivery. It is common to forget to complete an action when one is interrupted partway through it by a page, for example. Approaches that may be helpful in this area include minimizing interruptions and setting up tools that help define the urgency of an interruption.

Complexity represents a key issue that contributes to errors. Providers are confronted by streams of data (e.g., laboratory tests and vital signs), many of which provide little useful information but some of which are important and require action or suggest a specific diagnosis. Tools that emphasize specific abnormalities or combinations of abnormalities may be helpful in this area.

Transitions between providers and settings are also common in health care, especially with the advent of the 80-h workweek, and generally represent points of vulnerability. Tools that provide structure in exchanging information—for example, when transferring care between providers—may be helpful.

The Frequency of Adverse Events in Health Care   Most large studies focusing on the frequency and consequences of adverse events have been performed in the inpatient setting; some data are available for nursing homes, but much less information is available about the outpatient setting. The Harvard Medical Practice Study, one of the largest studies to address this issue, was performed with hospitalized patients in New York. The primary outcome was the adverse event: an injury caused by medical management rather than by the patient's underlying disease. In this study, an event either resulted in death or disability at discharge or prolonged the length of hospital stay by at least 2 days. Key findings were that the adverse event rate was 3.7% and that 58% of the adverse events were considered preventable. Although New York is not representative of the United States as a whole, the study was replicated later in Colorado and Utah, where the rates were essentially similar. Since then, other studies using analogous methodologies have been performed in various developed nations, and the rates of adverse events in these countries appear to be ~10%. Rates of safety issues appear to be even higher in developing and transitional countries; thus, this is clearly an issue of global proportions. The World Health Organization has focused on this area, forming the World Alliance for Patient Safety.

In the Harvard Medical Practice Study, adverse drug events (ADEs) were most common, accounting for 19% of all adverse events, and were followed in frequency by wound infections (14%) and technical complications (13%). Almost half of adverse events were associated with a surgical procedure. Among nonoperative events, 37% were ADEs, 15% were diagnostic mishaps, 14% were therapeutic mishaps, 13% were procedure-related mishaps, and 5% were falls.

ADEs have been studied more than any other error category. Studies focusing specifically on ADEs have found that they appear to be much more common than was suggested by the Harvard Medical Practice Study, although most other studies use more inclusive criteria. Detection approaches in the research setting include chart review and